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Lipsitz v. State, 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 17 (June 6, 2019)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW: COMPETENCY, AUDIOVISUAL TESTIMONY, EVIDENCE 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court reviewed an appeal from a defendant who was convicted of seven sexually 
related counts. The defendant challenged his conviction on three grounds: (1) that the district court 
erred in permitting the victim to testify via two-way audiovisual transmission; (2) that the district 
court abused its discretion in proceeding to trial after the State raised concerns about the 
defendant’s competency; and (3) that the district court erred in convicting the defendant of both 
sexual assault and attempted sexual assault where both counts were based on the same incident. 
 The Court concluded that the district court properly permitted testimony via audiovisual 
transmission and adopted the Craig test to determine when audiovisual testimony is proper. The 
court further concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the trial to 
proceed despite questions regarding the defendant’s competency, but that the district court erred 
in convicting the defendant of both sexual assault and attempted sexual assault. 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
 The defendant was charged with seven sexually related counts including both sexual 
assault and attempted sexual assault. The victim alleged that the defendant trespassed into a 
residential treatment facility where the victim was seeking treatment for trauma related to her 
previous experiences as a sex trafficking victim. At around 5 a.m., the victim awoke to find the 
defendant standing at the end of the couch, in the recreation room, upon which she had been 
sleeping. The defendant allegedly exposed himself to the victim and forced her to have sex with 
him. The defendant then attempted to force the victim to perform fellatio on him, but she was able 
to resist. Angry at her resistance, the defendant walked away. Another patient and facility staff 
members saw the defendant exiting the treatment center. Police officers found the defendant near 
the center. 
 After being indicted, the defendant invoked his right to a speedy trial. The defendant 
subsequently opposed a motion, brought by the State, to allow the victim to testify via two-way 
audiovisual transmission. The district court granted the State’s motion, because the victim was a 
patient at an out-of-state treatment center and because the defendant had refused to allow a 
continuance of the trial until the victim was released from the treatment facility. Thus, the d istrict 
court ruled, the only way for the victim to testify on the preset trial dates was by deposition or by 
audiovisual transmission. 
 During a pretrial hearing, the State raised concerns regarding the defendant’s competency. 
The defendant’s counsel refuted any competency concerns and, after the court engaged in a 
“lengthy canvas” of the defendant, the court found no basis to doubt his competency. The next 
day, the court again canvassed the defendant and again found him competent to proceed to trial. 
The district court again questioned the defendant’s competency when, on the first day of trial, the 
defendant refused to change into a suit despite concerns that appearing before the jury in jail 
clothes might prejudice the jury against him. After conferring with the defendant’s counsel, the 
district court once again found the defendant to be competent for trial. 
 
1  By Jordan Gregory Cloward. 
 During trial, the defendant repeatedly rebuked the court for permitting the victim to testify 
via audiovisual transmission. The defendant was angered, it appeared, by a misunderstanding over 
how the audiovisual technology worked – the defendant thought that the victim’s testimony had 
been prerecorded and was being presented to the court via YouTube. Eventually, the defendant 
waived his right to appear at trial and the district court ordered his removal from the courtroom. 
The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts except for one count of sexual assault . 
The district court sentenced the defendant to 20 years to life in prison. 
 
Discussion 
 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding to trial after the State expressed 
concerns about the defendant’s competency 
 
 The Court reviewed the district court’s refusal to order a competency evaluation under an 
abuse of discretion standard of review.2 While whether there is a doubt as to a defendant’s 
competency is within the discretion of the trial court, where there is “substantial evidence that the 
defendant may not be competent to stand trial,” the trial court must hold a competency hearing.3 
 The Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding to trial 
because there was substantial evidence that the defendant was competent to stand trial. The trial 
court relied on assurances from the defendant’s counsel, its own interactions with the defendant, 
and the defendant’s responses to the court’s canvass in concluding that the defendant was 
competent for trial. While the defendant’s behavior was “obstinate,” the record did not provide 
enough evidence to support a conclusion of discretion of abuse by the trial court. 
 
Allowing the victim to testify via simultaneous audiovisual transmission, pursuant to the procedure 
set forth in Nevada Supreme Court Rules Part IX-A(B), did not violate the defendant’s rights under 
the Confrontation Clause 
 
 The Court reviewed de novo whether the trial court violated the defendant’s rights under 
the Confrontation Clause in permitting the victim to testify via two-way audiovisual transmission.4 
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides criminal defendants the right to cross-
examine witnesses who testify against them.5 However, face-to-face confrontation at trial may be 
denied where “denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and 
only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.”6 
 The Court took the opportunity to adopt the Supreme Court’s test presented in Craig v. 
Maryland, to determine whether permitting a witness to testify via audiovisual transmission 
violates a defendant’s right to confrontation.7 The Court concluded that the district court properly 
 
2  See Olivares v. State, 124 Nev. 1142, 1148 (2008) (“A district court abuses its discretion and denies a defendant 
his right to due process when there is reasonable doubt regarding a defendant's competency and the district court 
fails to order a competency evaluation”). 
3  Melchor-Gloria v. State, 99 Nev. 174, 180 (1983); Olivares, 124 Nev. at 1148. 
4  See Chavez v. State, 125 Nev. 328, 339 (2009) (“whether a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights were violated 
is ‘ultimately a question of law that must be reviewed de novo’” (citations omitted)). 
5  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). 
6  Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990). 
7  Under the Craig test, two-way video testimony is permitted if (1) it “is necessary to further an important public 
policy,” and (2) “the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.” Id. 
permitted the victim to testify via two-way transmission because the decision (1) promoted 
“important public policy” by protected the victim’s well-being and ensuring the defendant’s right 
to a speedy trial, and (2) the transmission permitted the jury to hear and observe the victim and 
permitted the defendant to cross-examine the victim. 
 
The defendant’s conviction for both sexual assault and attempted sexual assault based on the same 
conduct was in error, and there was insufficient evidence to uphold the sexual assault charge 
 
 The defendant argued, and the state conceded, that the convictions of both sexual assault 
and attempted sexual assault based upon a single act – namely, the defendant touching his penis to 
the victim’s closed mouth – could not stand simultaneously. The defendant argued that the Court 
should vacate the sexual assault conviction because there was no penetration, while the State 
argued that the conviction of sexual assault was valid, based upon the definition of fellatio 
presented in the jury instructions.8 The Court agreed that both convictions could not stand, and 
reviewed the record to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of 
the greater of the two charges – sexual assault. 
 The Court conducted its analysis under a sufficiency of evidence standard of review.9 As 
relevant to the case, NRS 200.364(9) defines sexual penetration as “fellatio, or any intrusion, 
however slight, of any part of a person’s body.”10 To prove attempted sexual assault, the 
prosecution must establish “that (1) [the defendant] intended to commit sexual assault; (2) [the 
defendant] performed some act toward the commission of the crime; and (3) [the defendant] failed 
to consummate its commission.”11 Thus to affirm the defendant’s conviction, there must have been 
sufficient evidence that he consummated the act of fellatio. 
 While fellatio does not require penetration, it does require “obtaining sexual satisfaction 
by oral stimulation of the penis.”12 Here, because the victim had testified that the defendant had 
pressed his penis against her closed lips “just once,” the Court held that there was insufficient 
evidence to support a conviction of sexual assault. Rather, the defendant had attempted a sexual 
assault and had failed.13 As such, the Court vacated the sexual assault conviction and remanded 
the case to the district court with instructions to amend its judgment consistent with the Court’s 
opinion. 
 
Conclusion 
  
 The Court concluded that the district court did not err in its decision to allow the victim to 
testify via two-way audiovisual transmission and that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in allowing the defendant to proceed to trial despite concerns regarding his competency. The Court 
 
8  The jury instruction regarding the definition of fellatio was, “[o]ral stimulation of the penis for sexual 
satisfaction.” 
9  “[W]hether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 
319 (1979); see also Origel-Candido v. State, 114 Nev. 378, 381 (1998), 
10  Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.364(9). 
11  Van Bell v. State, 105 Nev. 352, 354 (1989) (citing NRS 193.330). 
12  Maes v. Sherrif, 94 Nev. 715, 716 (1978) (citation omitted) (concluding that the State met its burden of proving 
sexual assault where the defendant licked the victim’s penis because there was oral stimulation, even in absence of 
penetration). 
13  See Crawford v. State, 107 Nev. 345, 351 (1991). 
further concluded that the district court erred in convicting the defendant of both sexual assault 
and attempted sexual assault based upon the same conduct, and that there was insufficient evidence 
for a conviction of sexual assault. 
